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In this article, I propose to analyze party system institutionalization in multiparty 
presidential countries in terms of the stability of the alliances made by parties to elect 
the president and form governments, and in terms of the coherence of parties’ 
strategies across the electoral and governing arenas. I argue that institutionalization is 
likely to increase as the parties that comprise the system interact in predictable ways, 
by forming large pre-electoral coalitions to dispute the presidency and these coalitions, 
in turn, provide voters with clear and distinctive government alternatives. I extend and 
complement the three dimensions of party system closure developed by Mair 
(1996;2002) and Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi (2016) by incorporating a set of measures to 
account for the degree of congruence between the structure of presidential competition 
and the formation of governments, and for the stability of interparty interactions in the 
presidential arena. The article relies on an in-depth case study of Brazil’s party systems 
that emerged during the post-1985 and the 1946-1964 democratic periods to examine 
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At least since Juan Linz (1990) inaugurated the first wave of presidential 
studies, scholars have been mostly skeptical about the possibility of conciliating stable 
and institutionalized party systems with the presidential system of government. It has 
been argued that one central aspect that differentiates presidentialism from 
parliamentarism – the popular election of the chief executive – has a detrimental impact 
on party and party system institutionalization (Andrews & Bairett, 2014; Casal Bértoa, 
2012; Clark & Wittrock, 2005; Ishiyama & Kennedy, 2001; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007). 
Analyzing Central and Eastern European countries, Andrews and Bairret (2014) claim 
that the stronger the presidential powers, the greater the elite incentives to create new 
party vehicles to compete for the presidency, thus increasing volatility. Mainwaring and 
Zocco (2007) argue that presidential systems personalize the vote for the head of 
government and, therefore, they might be more vulnerable to political outsiders.  In the 
same line, Samuels and Shugart (2010, p. 127), claim that parties have an incentive to 
present presidential candidates who can cultivate a personal vote above and beyond 
their own party.   
Despite its theoretical and empirical achievements, this literature has failed to 
develop appropriate concepts and measures to assess party system institutionalization 
under the separation of powers, by overlooking some important institutional features of 
presidentialism, as well as the variation that exists both across and within presidential 
democracies. Even if it is true that pure parliamentary democracies tend to develop 
more institutionalized party systems than either pure or hybrid presidential countries, 
one still needs to account for: (a) party system change and development throughout 
time within specific presidential countries; (b)  the variation that exists in the degree of 
party institutionalization across polities with popularly elected executives. 
In this article, I propose to analyze party system institutionalization in multiparty 
presidential countries in terms of the stability of the alliances made by parties to elect 
the president and form governments, and in terms of the coherence of parties’ 
strategies across the electoral and governing arenas. I argue that institutionalization is 
likely to increase as the parties that comprise the system interact in predictable ways, 
by forming large pre-electoral coalitions to dispute the presidency and these coalitions, 
in turn, provide voters with clear and distinctive government alternatives.  
Because presidential elections are highly majoritarian, they create strong 
incentives for pre-electoral bargaining and for the formation of electoral blocs, 
especially in multiparty settings where no single-party can expect to obtain alone a 
majority of the vote. Also, presidential races present a large and important prize that is 
awarded in what is essentially a winner-takes-all fashion, which greatly increases the 
incentives for coordination (Cox, 1999). The formation of large pre-electoral coalitions 
around the presidential frontrunners in fragmented, multiparty systems may impose a 
constraint on party strategies in the post-electoral period. Comparative evidence on 
Latin American countries demonstrates that governing coalitions in presidential 
4 
 
systems originate, in many instances, from the winning pre-electoral coalition. On the 
other hand, the runner up in the presidential race and his allies in the legislature will 
often join the ranks of the opposition (Adrián Albala, 2016; Chasquetti, 2008; 
Freudenreich, 2016). If the parties and coalitions competing in the presidential election 
do not substantially change over time and party strategies are reasonably consistent 
across the governing and electoral arenas, voters will come to recognize the major 
blocs in the presidential race as clearly distinct government alternatives.  
Following Mair (1996) and Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi (2016), I define PSI in 
terms of the stability of the interactions of parties in the governmental arena. Party 
systems are closed when there is little or no change over time in the range of 
governing alternatives or in the pattern of alternation, and with new parties 
systematically failing to gain access to office. I extend and complement this conceptual 
scheme by incorporating a set of measures to account for the degree of congruence 
between the structure of presidential competition and the formation of governments, 
and for the stability of interparty interactions in the presidential arena. 
I rely on an in-depth case study of Brazil’s party systems that emerged during 
the post-1985 and the 1946-1964 democratic periods to examine these various 
dimensions of party system institutionalization. Brazil is an ideal case because both 
democratic eras saw the development of multiparty systems where pre- and post-
electoral coalitions were common currency. At the same time, there is substantial 
variation across periods in what concerns the structure of party competition and the 
linkages between the electoral and governing arenas. Another advantage of this 
comparative design is the fact that these two party systems developed relatively 
independently from each other and may be treated as mostly distinct “cases”. Indeed, 
the major parties that organized during and after the democratic transitions of 1946 and 
1985 did not exist before, which is to say that the characteristics of political parties and 
party systems are unlikely to stem from path-dependent, long-term trajectories of 
particular parties.  
The article contributes to two distinct literatures. First, it relies on Mair’s (1996) 
concept of party system closure to propose an innovative approach to analyze party 
system institutionalization in presidential countries The focus is on multiparty, 
coalitional presidentialism, although these concepts and measures may be further 
refined and adapted to account for cases in which pre- and post-electoral coalitions are 
uncommon.  Second, the article contributes to the country-specific literature on party 
systems and PSI in Brazil. Although there seems to be a relative consensus in that the 
current party system is characterized by a relatively stable structure of competition 
(Braga, 2010; Braga & Pimentel Jr, 2011; Limongi & Cortez, 2010; Melo & Câmara, 
2012; Tarouco, 2010; Zucco Jr, 2011), empirical analyses have not yet provided a set 
of comparable and easily replicable measures to account for the actual pattern of 
interparty interactions. Besides, comparisons between the current and the previous 






1. Party system institutionalization and party system closure  
 
Party institutionalization is, by definition, a multidimensional concept, which has 
motivated substantial debate on strategies of conceptualization, operationalization and 
measurement (Chiaramonte & Emanuele, 2015; Luna, 2014; Mainwaring, Gervasoni, & 
España-Najera, 2017; Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006; Mair, 
1996). However, despite the great number of available measures of institutionalization, 
the comparative literature has focused on the anchors of parties in society (the 
institutionalization of parties), neglecting the pattern of interactions among parties 
(party system institutionalization) (Casal Bértoa & Enyedi, 2017).  Although it is often 
assumed that the systemic and party-level dimensions of institutionalization are closely 
related and may be treated as a single and coherent composite measure (Bizzarro, 
Hicken, & Self, 2017; Mainwaring & Torcal, 2006), there are good theoretical and 
methodological reasons to conceptualize and analyze these two dimensions separately 
(Casal Bértoa & Enyedi, 2016; Mair, 1996; Randall & Svåsand, 2002; Toole, 2000).  
The institutionalization of parties may be understood as the strength and 
durability of party organizations, their rootedness in society and their social legitimacy. 
These constitute three of the four dimensions proposed by Mainwaring and Scully 
(1995) in their oft-quoted book on Latin American party systems. The remaining 
dimension - the stability and regularity of party competition patterns – is not necessarily 
related to the individual properties of parties. Rather, it depends on the regularity and 
predictability of interactions among the parties that constitutes the system.   
Luna (2014) has demonstrated, indeed, that the four dimensions conflated in 
the party system institutionalization (PSI) concept do not relate linearly. His conclusion 
is that scholars should analyze separately the party competition patterns dimension 
(most often operationalized as electoral volatility), and the party-voter linkages (social 
rootedness) dimension (idem, p. 461-462). Note further that the Pedersen index of 
electoral volatility is a limited and imprecise measure, to the extent that electoral 
stability is not synonymous with stability in the patterns of interparty interactions. It is 
theoretically and empirically possible to witness low levels volatility, in the sense that 
the same parties compete election after election and obtain very similar vote shares, 
while at the same time the alliances made by these parties to win elections and gain 
access to government substantially change over time (Mair, 1996). This is not to say, 
however, that the structure of party competition is unrelated to the degree of stability of 
parties’ electoral support. These dimensions are indeed associated with each other, to 
the extent that party system consolidation depends on the stability of the components 
of the system (Toole, 2000; Bértoa and Enyiedi, 2017). However, measures of electoral 
stability are insufficient to account for the actual structure of party competition. 
Considering the limitations of existing concepts and measures that focus on 
electoral stability and change, I utilize the approach to PSI developed by Mair (1996, 
2002) and refined by Casal-Bertoa and Enyied (2016;2017). Mair (1996) has defined 
party system institutionalization as the degree of party system closure. The structure of 
party competition is said to be closed when the process of government formation is 
restricted to a small group of parties that establish regular and predictable alliances 
among themselves. A high degree of party system closure implies that the protagonists 
and the patterns of their alliances are stable (Casal Bértoa & Enyedi, 2016, p. 266).   
Although parties do not interact only in the governmental arena, there are a 
number of theoretical and empirical reasons that justify the focus on the formation of 
governments. First, national government is the major political prize of party competition 
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and, therefore, the pursuit of public office is likely to shape parties’ strategies to a very 
a substantial extent (Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi, 2016). Second, recent trends in the 
development of parties and party systems in old democracies indicate the decline of 
parties as membership, representative organizations and the ascendancy of the party 
in public office (Katz & Mair, 1995; Mair, 2006). To the extent that parties have lost the 
capacity to represent voters in an ideological or purposive sense, party systems have 
tended to organize in bipolar fashion, as alternative teams of leaders that compete for 
access to government (Mair, 2006, p. 70). The characterization of parties as office-
seekers is even more likely to apply to recently democratized countries, where parties 
have been less central in the struggle to expand citizenship, and they have had a much 
weaker impact on the formation of voters’ identities (Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007). 
Overall, the concept of party system closure rests on the assumption that party 
systems institutionalize as political parties interact in predictable ways, providing voters 
with a clear set of government alternatives (Mari, 1996; 2006). Closure is comprised of 
three dimensions. The first dimension concerns the prevailing pattern of alternation in 
government and the extent to which it is wholesale, partial or non-existent. Wholesale 
alternation implies that a set of incumbents are wholly displaced by a former 
opposition. No alternation, on the other hand, occurs when a party or coalition of 
parties remains in government for extended periods of time. Partial alternation is in 
between these two polar patterns and refers to a situation in which a newly incumbent 
government includes at least one party that also formed part of the previous 
government (Mair, 1996, p. 90-92).  
The second dimension concerns the degree to which the governing formulas, 
that is, the combinations of parties in government are either familiar or innovative. Most 
certainly, innovation may occur simply because the party or group of parties in 
government had never occupied cabinet posts before. But note that innovation is often 
a result of new alliances formed between parties with previous experience in 
government. The issue is, therefore, whether or not the governing formula has been 
tested before. In some countries , innovation is almost non-existent, in that 
governments are always formed by a few coalitions, and these coalitions are 
comprised of the very same parties.  
The third and last dimension of party system closure is access to government. It 
differentiates party systems in terms of the extent to which access to government is 
either open to a wide range of parties or limited to a smaller subset of parties (Mair, 
1996). Governments are closed when they are formed exclusively by parties that 
governed  in the past. Alternatively, governments said to be open when they include, or 
are even dominated by, novices (Casal Bértoa & Enyedi, 2016, p. 267). 
By considering these three dimensions, one can assess the degree of party 
system closure. Closed systems are those in which: (1) alternations of governments 
are wholesale or none; (2) the governing formulas are stable over time; (3) access to 
government is restricted to a narrow circle of established parties. By the same token, 
systems are considered to be open when alternations of governments tend to be 
partial, the governing formulas change substantially over time , and access to 
government is open to a wide range of parties, including newly established ones  







1.1 – Presidential elections, pre-electoral coalitions and the structure of party 
competition 
 
In presidential polities, party system institutionalization involves not only a 
stable pattern of interparty interactions in the formation of governments, but also a 
reasonable degree of consistency of parties’ behavior across the electoral and 
governing arenas. In this sense, the components of party system closure discussed 
above must be complemented and contrasted with additional measures that account 
for: (a) the congruence between the structure of competition over the national 
executive and the formation of governments; (b) the stability of that same structure of 
competition.  
The popular election of the national executive may foster pre-electoral 
bargaining and organize party competition around a few coalitions, in part because 
presidential elections present a large and important prize that is awarded in what is 
essentially a winner-takes-all fashion. Furthermore, the presidential race is a highly 
majoritarian contest that encourages vote-seeking behavior to a much greater extent 
than any parliamentary system does. Regardless of the electoral system employed to 
select the national executive, parties that nominate presidential candidates must gain  
the votes of a large portion of the national electorate (Samuels, 2002). Vote-seeking 
incentives tend to be strongest when presidential and legislative elections are 
concurrent. Simultaneous races magnify the electoral stakes of the presidential contest 
and it is likely that the same parties will be the frontrunner in both presidential and 
legislative elections (Cox, 1999; Hicken, 2009).  
Congruence between electoral majorities formed in presidential and legislative 
races depends mostly on the strength of the coattails effect, or how much a presidential 
candidate affects other candidates from the same party label (or coalition) in national 
legislative elections. When presidential elections are held concurrently with legislative 
elections, voters should rely on their preferred presidential candidate as an information 
shortcut to help them select a candidate for the legislature, generating strong coattails 
for the more competitive presidential candidates (Borges & Turgeon, 2017; Golder, 
2006; Jones, 1994; Samuels, 2002; Shugart, 1995; Shugart & Carey, 1992). 
To the extent that concurrent elections increase the “size of the prize” to be 
awarded to the winner of the presidential race, they create incentives for coordination 
of like-minded politicians across electoral districts (Hicken, 2009; Hicken & Stoll, 2011). 
In multiparty, fragmented systems, these coordination effects are likely to involve the 
organization of large pre-electoral coalitions around the top vote-gatherers in the 
presidential race.  Usually, electoral partners allow the presidential candidate to obtain 
the support of segments of the electorate otherwise inaccessible, and they aggregate 
valuable organizational resources, increasing the candidate’s chances of winning the 
presidency (Spoon & West, 2015). On the other hand, parties joining an electoral 
coalition not only give up the possibility of controlling the presidency themselves, at the 
same time they lose an important tool to reach voters, but they also risk losing 
credibility and weakening their party base if the coalition is not perceived as adequate 
(Freudenreich, 2016, p. 5). Because there are substantial costs for parties to join the 
pre-electoral coalition, the formateur party (e.g., the party of the presidential candidate) 
usually compensates coalition partners by supporting them in simultaneous, lower-level 
elections (Borges and Turgeon, 2017). Furthermore, the formateur can compensate 
coalition allies by making policy concessions and promising cabinet positions in the 
case of winning (Freudenreich, 2016; Kellam, 2015). 
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Although these electoral agreements are not binding (Kellam, 2015), winning 
presidential candidates have important incentives to keep their promises after taking 
power, and transforming their electoral alliance into a governing one. Indeed, during 
the governing process presidents need a strong reputation to negotiate with the 
legislature, which strongly constrains them to keep their promises by inviting pre-
electoral coalition members into the cabinet (Freudenreich, 2016, p. 6). The 
comparative evidence on Latin American countries suggests, indeed, that multiparty 
cabinets very often originate from pre-electoral coalitions (Adrian Albala, 2014; Adrián 
Albala, 2016; Chasquetti, 2008)1.  
Pre-electoral coordination may shape not only the behavior of the members of 
the winning coalition, but it is also likely to exert a strong impact on the strategies of the 
losing parties. Most certainly, the runner-up in the presidential election will reduce its 
ability to differentiate itself from government and present a viable alternative to the 
incumbent candidate in the subsequent election if it decides to join the presidential 
cabinet to obtain short-term office benefits. Evidence on Latin American cases 
demonstrates, indeed, that parties that present a strong candidate against the eventual 
winner are less likely to join the cabinet (Freudenreich 2016).  
To the extent that the parties that comprise the winning pre-electoral coalition 
are usually invited to form governments, whereas the losing coalition parties form the 
opposition bloc in the legislature, there will be a high degree of congruence between 
voters’ choices and the selection of government  alternatives. Theoretically, in the 
presence of substantial congruence between pre- and post-electoral coalitions, the 
party system likely stabilizes if the same major parties regularly compete in the 
presidential race, and pre-electoral coalitions do not change substantially between 
elections. On the other hand, if the coalitions formed around the strongest presidential 
candidates are stable, but party strategies are incoherent in the sense that the 
presidential race does not substantially constrains parties’ decision to either oppose or 
support the incumbent government, then the party blocs competing over the presidency 
will not represent clearly distinguishable government alternatives. 
Table 1 presents a hypothetical example of coalition formation during and after 
the presidential election that illustrates the point made above. Presidential elections in 
the table are organized from the oldest to the most recent. The second and third 
columns show the partisan composition of the winning and the second largest pre-
electoral coalitions. For the sake of simplicity , I assume that presidents form a single 
cabinet that stays in place during the whole of their terms. The composition of cabinets 
is displayed in the last column.  
  
                                                          
1 Even if presidents sometimes invite additional parties into the cabinet, enlarging the original 
alliance, being a member of the winning pre-electoral coalition greatly increases the odds of a party 










PEC Losing PEC 
Government 
coalition 
1 A-D-F B-C-G A-D-B-C 
2 B-C-G A-D-F A-D-B-C 
3 B-C-W-Y A-L-G B-C-W-Y 
4 B-C-L-G A-W-Y B-C-L-G 
Source: the author. 
Pre-electoral coalitions formed in elections 1 and 2 are stable and do not 
change between races. Also, the very same parties form the government, which 
indicates a high degree of party system closure in terms of Mair’s (1996) conceptual 
scheme. However, parties’ behavior is inconsistent across the electoral and governing 
arenas. Parties B and C that were defeated by the coalition A-D-F in election 1 form a 
cabinet with their former opponents. In election 2, the A-D-F coalition is defeated, but 
parties A-D are again part of a coalition together with parties B and C. Although there is 
no alternation and access to government is restricted to the very same parties, there 
are good reasons to argue that party competition lacks a clear structure in the periods 
1 and 2.  That is, it is not possible to speak of a stable, bipolar pattern of competition 
opposing coalitions A-D-F and B-C-G, because these two blocs do not represent 
clearly distinguishable government alternatives. 
During the presidential terms following elections 3 and 4, there is total 
congruence between the winning pre-electoral coalition and the incumbent 
government. On the other hand, pre-electoral coalitions are not stable. Parties W and Y 
are allied with B and C in election 3, whereas in election 4 they opt for supporting party 
A’s presidential candidate. Also,  in election 4 parties B and C make an alliance with 
two parties that were previously allied with A (L and G). 
If one considers only party interactions in the governing arena, the party system 
that emerges after elections 3 and 4 is certainly less institutionalized than the party 
system of the previous period. After election 4, there is partial government alternation 
and two parties that had never been in government before are invited into the cabinet 
(L and G), forming an innovative coalition. However, despite the instability of electoral 
and government coalitions, the second party system has greater consistency in parties’ 
behavior across the electoral and governing arenas. On the other hand, the previous 
party system lacks clearly distinct competing electoral blocs. In reality, both party 
systems are poorly institutionalized, yet for different reasons. Looking only at the 
indicators of post-electoral coalition formation would lead to an improper comparison 
between periods. 
In view of these potential limitations, the indicators of party system closure must 
be analyzed in combination with measures accounting for the stability in patterns of 
party competition and pre-electoral coordination in the presidential race, and for the 
degree of consistency in parties’ strategies across the electoral and governing arenas. 
In the following section, I discuss the operationalization of each of the dimensions of 
closure – alternation, formula and access – as well as the operationalization of three 




2. Data and measures 
I operationalize party system closure by relying on the measures proposed by 
Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi (2016). They substantially improve the original indicators 
developed by Mair (2008) by adopting a similar underlying logic that implies accounting 
for changes in the composition of governments weighting by the share of ministers 
belonging to each coalition party. 
Government alternation is calculated by applying the Pedersen index of 
electoral volatility to ministerial turnover. The original index of government alternation 
(IGA) proposed by Mair (2008, p. 43) considered the absolute sum of the gains of all 
“winning” parties (those that increased their share of ministers) and the losses of all 
“losing” parties (those that had their share of ministers reduced) divided by two. Higher 
volatility was expected to reflect higher closure on the grounds that closed party 
systems are characterized by wholesale alternation in government. Casal-Bértoa and 
Enyedi (2016) criticize this operationalization because only wholesale alternation is 
recognized as closure and no-alternation is not. Indeed, instances of no-alternation 
necessarily receive a score of zero in the IGA. Due to this limitation, Casal-Bértoa and 
Enyedi (2016, p. 269) propose a slightly different formula that measures stability in 
terms of the distance from that endpoint of the continuum (0-100) which is further way.  
For instance, if only 10% of the ministers belong to new parties, then the 90% of the 
government is similar to the previous one. In that case, the score should be 90 instead 
of 10. Using this logic, each cabinet receives a score ranging from 50 to 100. Finally, 
the score is converted back to the 0-100 scale by subtracting 50 from it and multiplying 
by 2. 
Government formula is calculated as the percentage of ministers belonging to 
the "familiar" part of the previous government. When the coalition is entirely new, in the 
sense that none of the parties that comprise it have formed a previous government, 
then the score is, by definition, zero. Totally familiar coalitions, on the other hand, 
receive a score of 100. In many cases, however, only part of the coalition is new, which 
requires comparing the composition of government with the most familiar coalition 
formed previously (Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi, 2016, p. 269-70).  Suppose a coalition 
formed by parties A-C-F-G-H that was never formed before. Suppose further that 
coalitions A-C-H and A-C have formed before. In that case, the A-C-F-G-H coalition 
must be compared with the largest familiar coalition (A-C-H). Therefore, government 
formula will be equal to the share of ministers controlled by parties A, C and H.  
 Access to government is measured as the percentage of old governing parties, 
defined as all those parties which have already been constituent parts of a previous 
government. Higher scores indicate that participation in government is relatively closed 
to new parties. 
Party system closure is a simple mean of the three indicators described above. 
Calculating means is justifiable in view of the moderate to high correlations observed 
between the three measures. Casal-Bértoa and Enyiedi (2016) found that the 
alternation and access indicators were the least strongly correlated in their large 
sample of European party systems. They relied on reliability and factor analyses to 
demonstrate that formula is the central component of closure.  
European party systems exhibited both mixed patterns, combining partial 
alternation with closed access and/or closed formula, and pure types (fully open or 
closed systems). Within the group of young democracies, mixed patterns were 
especially frequent (Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi, 2016, p. 271). It seems to be the case 
that partial alternation is not necessarily associated with open access and formula. 
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Throughout the article, I explore variation across the three components of closure to 
account for the potential differing patterns of association between them. 
Similarly to Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi (2016), I consider both elections to 
replace the head of government and changes in the partisan composition of cabinets 
as indicating the end of a government and the start of a new one. Although their 
empirical analyses focuses mostly on parliamentary and semi-presidential European 
countries, these defining criteria are routinely applied to the study of cabinets in pure 
presidential systems (Alemán & Tsebelis, 2011; Martínez-Gallardo, 2012).  
There is, however, an important difference between presidential and non-
presidential democracies that must be taken into account in the calculus of the party 
system closure scores. Chief executives in presidential countries are usually endowed 
with much greater discretion to appoint and fire ministers and, therefore, the share of 
non-partisan ministers is likely to be much higher in presidentialism as compared to 
parliamentarism (Amorim Neto, 2006; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015). Because 
variation in the percentage of partisan ministers owing to variation in presidents’ 
cabinet appointment strategies might exert substantial impact on the calculus of the 
scores, I opted for calculating percentages relatively to the total of ministers excluding 
non-partisans.  
To account for the degree of congruence between the formation of governments 
and the structure of competition over the presidency, I utilize two indicators. The first is 
a measure of opposition incongruence that considers the percentage of ministers 
affiliated with the parties that comprise the largest losing pre-electoral coalition in the 
previous presidential election. High values in the index indicate that parties pursue 
inconsistent strategies in the governing and electoral arenas, and, therefore, the lines 
that would usually separate the incumbent government from the opposition in 
presidential systems are blurred. The second indicator relies on a similar logic to 
produce a broader measure of the importance of post-electoral bargaining for coalition 
formation. The post-electoral coalition index is calculated as the percentage of 
ministers belonging to parties absent from the winning pre-electoral coalition. High 
values in the index indicate that pre-electoral bargaining shapes the formation of 
governments only to a limited extent, as presidents rely mostly on the support of parties 
absent from the electoral alliance. As coalitions are mostly formed in the post-electoral 
period, they are more likely to be detached from the structure of competition in the 
presidential arena. Although the measures of coalition incongruence and post-electoral 
coalition formation tend to be correlated, they are different, in the sense that the 
second measure is broader  and accounts for the presence of any party that did not 
support the election of the president, including parties that were absent from the 
presidential race. 
Finally, I developed an electoral formula score to measure the degree of 
stability of the pre-electoral coalitions formed in the presidential race. For each election 
and all presidential candidates with a share of the vote equal or superior to 1%, I 
calculated the size of the familiar part of the coalition relatively to the total coalition 
size. That is, if the coalition A-B-F was formed in presidential election t but in  election 
t-1 the coalition included only parties A-B, then I calculated the percentage of the votes 
obtained by A and B in the concurrent (or in the most proximate) legislative in relation 
to the total coalition vote. The percentages calculated for each pre-electoral coalition 
were then weighted by the share of the presidential vote to obtain a summary score. In 
those cases in which a party competed alone, I attributed to it a score of 100 if it had 
also competed in the previous race. Whenever a party present in the presidential race 
with a candidate of its own had not entered the previous race, either by filing a 
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candidate or entering a PEC, it received a score of zero. This procedure allows the 
electoral formula score to reflect the share of the presidential vote obtained by new 
parties: the greatest the share of parties absent from the previous election, the lowest 
the score. 
I relied on several sources to obtain data on the partisan composition of 
coalition cabinets and on the number of ministries allocated to coalition parties 
throughout Brazil’s two democratic periods. Data on the 1945-1964 period was 
obtained from Figueiredo (2007) and Hippolito (1985). For the 1985-2016 period, I 
relied on Amorim Neto (2018), Figueiredo (2007) and Meneguello (1998). Whenever I 
found inconsistencies across different sources, I consulted the website of the Brazilian 
presidency2. The data on the recent period includes all cabinets formed until the 
impeachment of president Dilma Roussef in May 2016. In future versions of the article, 
I expect to include data on cabinets formed during the Temer government. 
Data on presidential and lower chamber elections was obtained from the High 
Electoral Court’s website (www.repositorio.tse.gov.br) and from Nicolau (2004).  
 
3. Comparing Brazil’s democratic party systems 
 
The party systems that emerged after the democratic transitions of 1945 and 
1985 in Brazil share a fundamental similarity in what concerns the predominance of a 
mostly bipolar pattern of competition in the presidential race, as shifting coalitions led 
by the same set of parties obtained a very large proportion of the national vote in 
virtually all elections. From 1945 to 1964, the right-wing UDN (National Democratic 
Union) led center-right pre-electoral coalitions that competed against center-left PECs 
led by either the catchall PSD (Social Democratic Party) or the left-wing PTB (Brazilian 
Labor Party). All the presidents elected in between 1945 and 1960 were either affiliated 
with (or supported by) one of these three parties. Also, the PSD, the UDN and the PTB 
were the major players in Congress and in all other elections (Lavareda, 1999; Soares, 
2001). 
In the recent period, the democratic transition was not inaugurated by a direct 
presidential election as in 1945. Instead, the first president was indirectly elected by 
Congress in 1985. The first presidential race was only held in 1989, four years after the 
transition. Different from the mostly bipolar race disputed in 1945, when plurality rule 
was employed to elect the president, the 1989 election was a highly fragmented 
contest. Arguably, the utilization of majority runoff in a nonconcurrent election 
decreased the incentives for coordination, and virtually all the relevant parties opted to 
file a presidential candidate of their own. 
Scholars have tended to agree that the period comprehended between the 
transition and the 1994 presidential election was marked by substantial instability in 
patterns of party competition, as the artificial two-party system created by the military 
regime was gradually replaced by a multiparty one. From 1994 onwards, high levels of 
fragmentation notwithstanding, the presidential race acquired a more stable structure, 
as pre-electoral coalitions led by the left-wing PT (Worker’s Party) and the centre-right 
PSDB (Brazilian Social Democratic Party) obtained the lion’s share of the national vote, 
alternating in government (Braga, 2010; Limongi & Cortez, 2010; Melo & Câmara, 
2012).  
Figure 1 below shows the sum of the vote obtained by the top two presidential 
candidates and their supporting pre-electoral coalitions in all presidential races held 
from 1945 to 1960 and from 1989 to 2014. 
 
  






Figure 1: Share of the presidential vote obtained by the top two candidates (first 
round), 1945-1960; 1989-2014 
 
 
Source: TSE. Author’s elaboration.  
 
On average, the front-runners in the presidential race obtained 78% of the 
national vote between 1945 and 1960. In three out of the four elections held in the 
period, the top two pre-electoral coalitions obtained more than 75% of the vote. In the 
recent period, if the outlier 1989 election is excluded, the average share of the vote 
obtained by the largest PECs is also very high: 80.1%.  
Despite the obvious similarities in the structure of presidential competition, the 
party systems of these two periods differ markedly in what concerns the degree of 
fragmentation in the lower chamber. Between 1945 and 1964, the effective number of 
legislative parties ranged between 2.7 and 4.5, as the PSD, the UDN and the PTB 
together controlled a smashing majority of the seats throughout most of the period. In 
contrast, the party system that emerged after the 1989 presidential election is a hyper-
fragmented one. The effective number of legislative parties in the Chamber of Deputies 
reached a record high of 13.33 in 2014, as compared to 8.69 in 19903. 
Very high levels of fragmentation have impacted on the patterns of interparty 
interactions by fostering the formation of large and heterogeneous pre-electoral 
coalitions to increase the likelihood of winning the presidential race. Between 1945 and 
1960, PECs were formed in most cases by two large parties of similar size and a few 
small ones (such as the PSD-PTB coalitions in 1955 and 1960) or by a large party, 
which usually nominated the presidential candidate, and few small ones. But in the 
recent period, this pattern has changed substantially, as the parties that nominate 
competitive presidential candidates are themselves small- or medium-sized parties that 
only rarely control more than 15% of the seats in the lower chamber.  The necessity of 
inviting an ever-growing number of parties to form a competitive electoral alliance has 
led presidential candidates to form increasingly large and heterogeneous pre-electoral 
coalitions. 
Unsurprisingly, electoral alliances formed by the front-runners in the presidential 
race have been less stable in the recent period. Figure 2 below presents electoral 
formula scores for the 1950-1960 and 1994-2014 periods. Because the calculus of the 
scores requires comparing each presidential election with the previous one, I do not 
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report scores for the 1945 and 1989 races. Recall that this measure looks at the share 
of the legislative vote obtained by old pre-electoral coalition parties (that is, parties that 
made a coalition before) relatively to the total PEC vote. Scores for each coalition are 
weighted by their respective presidential vote.  
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Between 1950 and 1960, pre-electoral coalitions became more stable over time. 
Between 1994 and 2014, in contrast, it is hard to identify a clear trend, despite the 
growth of overall stability of electoral alliances throughout the period. Note further that 
average scores in the recent period are lower than those calculated for the 1950, 1955 
and 1960 elections (69.73 and 81.69, respectively). 
Despite the greater stability of electoral alliances in the previous democratic 
period, these differences have not translated into more closed and predictable patterns 
of government formation. I address the question of why this is so in the following 
section, where I look at the evolution of party system closure indicators and I analyze 
the linkages between pre-electoral bargaining and post-electoral coalition formation. 
 
3.1 – Party system closure and the degree of congruence between the electoral 
and governing arenas 
 
 
As a first comparative exercise, I calculated aggregate closure scores for the 
1946-1964 and 1985-2016 periods. I weighted scores by cabinet duration, following the 
same procedure adopted by Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi (2016). The aggregate 
measures of closure indicate that party system institutionalization is much higher in the 











Closure 84.71 69.94   
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Overall, the party system that emerged in the recent democratic period has had 
much less innovation in government formula than the post-1945 party system. Also, 
alternation patterns have become more closed. These two dimensions – alternation 
and formula – are responsible for most of the increase observed in the mean closure 
scores between the two periods. However, although alternation scores have 
experienced a substantial increase, they remain well below the end of scale, which 
may indicate the predominance of partial alternation.  A quick glance at the data 
reveals, indeed, that instances characterized by little or small change in the 
composition of cabinets, or by the replacement of the incumbent government by a 
completely different coalition of parties are uncommon.  
Figure 3 below shows the yearly variation in party system closure for the two 
periods. The yearly scores were calculated in the following way. When a single cabinet 
was formed in year t I considered the scores for that particular cabinet; otherwise, I 
averaged the scores for all the cabinets formed in the same year. 
 
 




Figure 3 suggests that the previous democratic period was marked by greater 
variation in closure scores. In particular, the cabinets formed immediately after the 
transition (Dutra government, 1946-1950) received abnormally low scores. After 1985, 
on the other hand, it is possible to notice a trend towards the stabilization of party 
system closure at high levels, especially after 1994, with the only exception of the low 
observed in 2003. In that year, president Lula formed a coalition comprised mostly of 
left-wing parties that had never been in government before and, therefore, the cabinet 
scored low on the access and formula dimensions. 
In what concerns the degree of congruence between the electoral and the 
governing arenas, the two party systems differ markedly. I calculated average 
opposition congruence scores for each period, weighting scores by cabinet duration. I 
also calculated separate means excluding all cabinets formed by non-elected 
presidents that were in charge of replacing a chief executive that could not complete 














































































































cabinets that were completely different from the pre-electoral coalition that elected their 
predecessors4.  
Opposition incongruence scores are reported in table 3 below. Recall that 
high/low values indicate a high/low proportion of ministries controlled by one or more 
parties that comprised the losing coalition in the presidential election.  





1990-2016 1.45 1.05  
When one considers the full range of cases the differences between the two 
periods are very substantial. Losing PEC parties controlled an average 30% of 
ministries between 1946-1964, as compared to a bare 1.4% for the 1990-2016 period. 
But even when non-elected presidents are excluded from the data set, the differences 
remain large : 15.1% against 1%. 
The high scores calculated for the first period are partly attributed to the 
incoherent behavior of the right-wing UDN. The party filed presidential candidates in 
three out of the four elections disputed between 1945 and 1960, and lost all of them to 
candidates affiliated with either the PTB (1950) or the PSD (1945 and 1955). However, 
the party joined two of the cabinets formed by president Dutra (1945-1950) and it also 
supported the interim government of Café Filho (1954-1955).  President Vargas (1950-
1954) appointed a number of UDN politicians to his cabinet, but the party opted for not 
making a coalition agreement with the president (Figueiredo, 2007). Still, the UDN 
remained deeply divided, and part of its legislative delegation – the so-called “chapa 
branca” faction – did support the Vargas’ government (Benevides, 1981). Because I 
only consider as members of cabinet those parties that formally joined the government, 
it is probably the case that the averages shown in table 3 actually underestimate the 
extent of incongruence between parties’ strategies in the electoral and governing 
arenas in the previous democratic era. 
Most certainly, part of the difference between the two periods is attributable to 
the greater number of cabinets formed by non-elected presidents between 1945 and 
19645. In many cases, presidential interruptions allowed parties that had been defeated 
in the previous presidential election to gain access to government. This was certainly 
the case of the PTB during the troubled Goulart government (1961-1964). 
Between 1990 and 2016, the largest losing parties and their allies in the 
presidential election have pursued mostly consistent strategies, by joining the ranks of 
the opposition after the election. Different from the previous party system, when the 
PSD and the UDN formed several governments, the major competitors in presidential 
elections – PT and PSDB – never joined the same cabinet. Although incongruent 
strategies have been more an exception than the rule in the recent period, one must 
                                                          
4
 The tendency of vice-presidents to form incongruent cabinets is understandable considering they were 
usually from a party different from the president they substituted. In particular, in the 1945-1964 period, 
vice-presidents were elected in a separate ticket. Note further that chief executives that govern the country 
in moments of deep political crisis following the interruption of the presidential mandate are more likely 
to form “grand coalitions” that bring together parties from all over the ideological spectrum. 
5
 The cabinets formed by Nereu Ramos, Café Filho and João Goulart accounted for 22% of the sum of 
the duration of all coalitions formed between 1945-1964. The data set for the 1985-2016 includes only 
one case of presidential interruption: the impeachment of Fernando Collor de Melo (1990-1992), who 
was substituted in office by Itamar Franco (1992-1994). 
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note that the electoral alliances formed by PT and PSDB substantially changed over 
time, and some parties have actually shifted their allegiances. For instance, the PMDB 
supported the presidential candidacy of José Serra (PSDB) in 2002, but in 2010 and in 
2014 it nominated the vice-presidential candidate in the ticket led by Dilma Roussef 
(PT).  
An additional difference between the two democratic periods concerns the 
relative importance of pre- and post-electoral bargaining for government formation. 
Table 4 presents weighted averages for the post-electoral coalition score. I also applied 
the same procedure utilized in the analysis of opposition incongruence, by calculating 
means for a subset of the data excluding non-elected presidents. Recall that the score 
is a simple proportion of the total of ministers not affiliated with the parties that 
comprise the winning pre-electoral coalition.  





1990-2016 29.49 30.76  
Once again, the weighted averages calculated for the previous democratic era 
are higher, although the differences are not too substantial for the subset of the data 
excluding non-elected presidents. It is worth noticing, however, that the Collor 
government (1990-1992) inflates the averages calculated for the 1990-2016 period. 
Collor did not form a pre-electoral coalition and relied instead on a newly created party 
– the PRN (Party of National Reconstruction) – to sustain his presidential project. 
Because the PRN had a tiny share of the seats in Congress, Collor had no option other 
than seeking the support of additional parties after the election. Note that all the other 
elected presidents in the data set relied on the support of a multiparty pre-electoral 
coalition. Given that the Collor government is clearly an outlier, I recalculated the 
weighted averages excluding that particular period, and obtained a significantly lower 
value: 23.46. 
These results indicate that presidents in the recent period have relied to a 
greater extent on pre-electoral coalition partners to form cabinets.  This is yet additional 
evidence that the connection between parties’ coordination in the electoral arena and 
the subsequent formation of governments has become stronger. 
How do the various indicators of party system closure and consistency of party 
strategies relate to each other? Table 5 presents correlation coefficients for all the 
indicators analyzed so far. The highest correlations in each row of the table are in bold. 
 
Table 5: Correlation Matrix for PSI indicators* 
Alternation Access Formula
Alternation 1.000 0.404 0.601
Access 0.404 1.000 0.931
Formula 0.601 0.931 1.000
Post-electoral coalition -0.340 -0.020 -0.102
Opposition incongruence -0.224 -0.085 -0.187  
* Correlations between the three dimensions of closure include all 50 yearly 
observations. The correlations for the post-electoral coalition and opposition 
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incongruence scores exclude 5 observations relative to the Sarney (1985-1990) 
government. 
Formula and access are very highly correlated, as expected. Correlation 
coefficients between these two dimensions and alternation scores are substantially 
lower, the lowest coefficient being observed for alternation and access. These results 
are mostly congruent with those found by Casal-Bértoa and Enyedi (2016) in their 
analysis of European party systems. The relatively low correlation observed for these 
two dimensions indicates that closed patterns of access to government may sometimes 
coexist with partial alternation. Indeed, the 1945-1964 party system fits very well this 
characterization: cases of no alternation or wholesale change in the composition of 
governments were virtually inexistent, and yet a small group of parties remained in 
government for long periods of time. Of the 20 cabinets formed in the period, the PSD 
was present in 19 (85%), whereas the PTB participated in 17 cabinets (85%). The 
persistence of these two parties in government, regardless of presidential elections and 
presidential interruptions, is consistent with the very low alternation scores observed, 
as new governments would always keep at least part of the previous one. 
Post-electoral coalition and opposition incongruence scores are negatively 
correlated with alternation (r=-0.340 and -0.224 , respectively). These dimensions are 
also negatively associated with formula, but correlation coefficients are substantially 
lower. It seems to be the case that, as the connection between the structure of 
competition in the presidential race and the formation of governments becomes more 
tenuous, changes in the composition of the winning pre-electoral coalition do not 
necessarily lead to changes in the composition of governments. Furthermore, as the 
political alignments in the presidential race do not impose a substantial constraint on 
cabinet formation, innovative government formulas are more likely to occur.  
Finally, there is no clear association between access to government and the 
measures of consistency of parties’ strategies. Relatively closed patterns of access to 
government can coexist with either consistent or inconsistent party behavior across the 
electoral and governing arenas. The lack of correlation between these two dimensions 
reflects the relatively small differences in government access scores across the two 
periods, in contrast with the substantial changes that occurred in what concerns the 
consistency of parties’ strategies. 
Overall, the party system formed after the 1985 democratic transition is 
characterized by greater stability of the patterns of government formation, and higher 
congruence in the patterns of interparty interactions in the electoral and governing 
arenas, as compared to previous democratic era. However, although both party 
systems exhibit a mostly bipolar structure of party competition in the presidential arena, 
the current party system is marked by somewhat lower stability of the electoral 
alliances formed around the major presidential candidates. Part of these differences 
are related to the much higher levels of party fragmentation observed in the recent 
period. They are also related to the erratic behavior of two of the largest parties of the 
post-1985 democracy – the PMDB and the PP - , which have supported governments 
and pre-electoral coalitions headed by both the PT and the PSDB. In other instances, 
the PMDB and the PP have opted for not entering the presidential race, to allow 
greater autonomy to subnational party branches in the making of alliances in 
gubernatorial and congressional elections (Borges, 2015). Arguably, the strategies 
pursued by these two parties have likely reduced the potential for organization of the 
party system around the PT-PSDB bipolarity. It is worth noticing that the PMDB 
participated in 30 out of 35 cabinets (85.71%) formed between 1985 and 2016, the 
19 
 
highest rate among all parties that formed governments in the period. The PP comes 
second: the party joined 25 of 35 cabinets (71.42%)6.  
Frequent changes in the composition of the largest pre-electoral coalitions in 
the recent period are also attributable to party competition over the crucial support of 
the median voter in presidential elections7. In particular, the left-wing PT moved from a 
strategy of restricting the range of potential pre-electoral coalition partners to 
ideologically similar organizations until 1998, to a catchall coalition-making strategy , as 
it moderated ideological appeals (Samuels and Shugart, 2010). From 2002 onwards,  
PT presidential candidates have sought to obtain the support of right-wing, office-
seeking parties that were actually ideologically closer to the party’s main rival, the 
PSDB, which resulted in formation of increasingly heterogeneous coalitions 8.  
 
Conclusion 
This article has proposed an approach to the analysis and measurement of 
party system institutionalization in multiparty presidential countries that accounts for 
both the stability of interparty interactions in the governing arena and the degree of 
congruence between the structure of competition in the presidential race and the 
formation of governments. This innovative approach was utilized to compare Brazil’s 
party systems across two distinct democratic periods.  
Mair (2006) has persuasively argued that the decline of parties as 
representative organizations and the rise of the party in public office imply that the 
institutionalization of party systems will depend to a great extent on whether or not the 
structure of party competition is sufficiently stable and predictable. This is so because 
parties that govern have a clearer need for immediate accountability than parties-as-
representatives, and accountability requires the provision of coherent and clearly 
distinguishable government  alternatives (idem, p. 70). In presidential countries, the 
direct election of the executive has a decisive impact on the patterns of interparty 
interactions, by creating incentives for the making of large pre-electoral coalitions 
around the most competitive candidates. I argue that the party system is most likely to 
organize around clearly distinctive teams of leaders that compete for office when pre-
electoral bargaining in the presidential race constrains, to a substantial extent, the 
subsequent formation of governments. 
The empirical findings support, indeed, the claim that a reasonable degree of 
congruence in parties’ strategies across the electoral and governing arenas is a 
necessary condition for party system institutionalization. Throughout the 1945-1964 
democratic era, the major competitors in the presidential race would often support the 
same governments, which in turn undermined the ability of party blocs formed in the 
                                                          
6
 Both the PMDB and the PP (formerly PDS/PPR/PPB) emerged from the party organizations created by 
the military regime: the pro-regime ARENA and the opposition MDB. The PMDB was able to play a 
central a role in the democratic transition, by electing then governor of Minas Gerais, Tancredo Neves, 
in an indirect election in 1985, with the support of regime dissidents. After the sudden death of Neves, 
in that same year, the presidency was taken over by José Sarney of the PFL. 
7 The majority runoff system utilized in Brazil since 1989 requires presidential candidates to obtain a 
qualified majority of 50% plus one vote to win the race. This is to say that the vote-seeking incentives 
associated with the presidential race are especially strong under the current electoral rules.  
8
 For instance, president Dilma Roussef was elected in 2010 by a coalition of over 10 parties that 
included both the Brazilian Communist Party (PC do B) and the evangelical right, dispersed across small 
parties such as the PR (Party of the Republic). 
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around competitive presidential candidates to present clear and distinctive government 
alternatives. In the recent period and, especially after 1994, these patterns substantially 
changed, as the congruence between the winning re-electoral coalitions in the 
presidential race and post-electoral government coalitions increased, while the losing 
PECs adopted a mostly consistent behavior, forming the opposition bloc in Congress. 
Patterns of alternation in government have become more closed, whereas 
opportunities for innovation in the making of government coalitions have decreased.  
Presidential competition now constrains, to a reasonable extent, parties’ decisions to 
join or not particular governments, preventing the formation of un-coherent cabinets 
including both the winners and the losers of the presidential race. 
However, although the behavior of parties-in-government has become more 
structured and predictable, such changes have not fundamentally altered other party 
and party system traits that conspire against a more solid and enduring stabilization of 
party competition. Relatively high levels of party system closure coexist with a handful 
of particularistic parties lacking clear policy platforms, which perform a rather important, 
if not determinative role, in the making and breaking of coalitions9. Party system 
fragmentation has increased in all elections held after 1998, and such proliferation of 
new parties has no connection with underlying political cleavages. Facing increasingly 
fragmented legislatures, presidents have been induced to form increasingly large and 
ideologically incongruent coalitions that are costly to manage and sustain (Bertholini & 
Pereira, 2017). Last but not least, the dilution of ideological differences between the PT 
and the PSDB, as both parties have sought to obtain the support of the same office-
seeking organizations to gain and remain in power, indicate that the current structure of 
party competition is lacking in ideological anchoring. To summarize, Brazil’s case 
reinforces the view that party institutionalization is a multidimensional and complex 
phenomenon, comprised of several dimensions that are not always and necessarily 
related to each other in linear fashion. 
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